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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
After being convicted of conspiracy to commit burglary, burglary, and 
misdemeanor trespass in a separate criminal case, Evin Christopher Devan filed a 
petition for post-conviction relief.  Mr. Devan was appointed counsel, but counsel did not 
file a response to the State’s motion for summary dismissal nor an amended petition.  
As a result, the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Devan’s petition.  Mr. Devan filed 
a Notice of Appeal timely from the order dismissing his petition and subsequently filed 
an I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion.  The district court later denied that motion. 
On appeal, Mr. Devan challenges the denial of the I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion.  He 
submits that the district court abused its discretion when it denied the motion because 
there was a complete absence of meaningful representation by his post-conviction 
counsel, and the district court denied the motion based on an improper analysis. 
    
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
After a jury trial, Mr. Devan was convicted of conspiracy to commit burglary, 
burglary, and misdemeanor trespass.  (R., p.41.)   Mr. Devan appealed, and the Court 
of Appeals affirmed his conviction.  (R., p.41.)  Mr. Devan then filed a timely petition for 
post-conviction relief on February 13, 2015.  (R., pp.4-7.)  In his petition, Mr. Devan 
argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “secure witnesses,” “failure to 
object,” and “failing to investigate defence (sic).”  (R., p.6.)  He also asserted there was 
new evidence.  (R., p.5.)  Mr. Devan requested the appointment of counsel, and Randall 
Grove, from the Canyon County Public Defender’s office, was appointed on 
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February 25, 2015.  (R, pp.9-11, 20-21, 38; Augmentation, p.45.) 1  However, on March 
24, 2015, the Canyon County Public Defender’s office filed a Notice of Conflict of 
Interest and Assignment of Conflict Counsel; Michael Nelson was subsequently 
appointed as counsel for Mr. Devan.  (Augmentation, p.45.)    
Meanwhile, on February 26, 2015, the State filed a motion for summary dismissal 
in which it argued that Mr. Devan’s petition contained no facts or evidence to support his 
claims.  (R., pp.31-35.)  Mr. Nelson never filed a response to the motion or an amended 
petition.  (Augmentation, p.48.)  Instead, at the hearing on the motion, which was held 
on July 10, 2015, Mr. Nelson said that he had met with Mr. Devan and discussed filing 
an amended petition with him, but he could not find any meritorious claims, so he was 
not contesting the State’s motion.  (7/10/15 Tr., p.5, Ls.17-25.)  The district court found 
that Mr. Devan “alleged no facts to support his petition” and that there was “no factual 
basis on which to determine the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.”  
(R., pp.43-44.)  As such, the district court granted the State’s motion for summary 
dismissal on July 11, 2015.  (R., pp.44.)  Mr. Devan filed a Notice of Appeal that was 
timely from the district court’s order and final judgment.  (R., pp.48-50.)  The State 
Appellate Public Defender’s Office was appointed on August 25, 2015.  (R., pp.63-64.) 
Subsequently, relying largely on Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731 (2010), and acting 
pro se, Mr. Devan filed a Motion and Memorandum for Relief from Judgment or Order 
(hereinafter, Rule 60(b) motion), in which he argued that he was entitled to relief from 
the order dismissing his post-conviction petition under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
                                            
1 All citations to the “Augmentation” refer to the documents referenced in the June 30, 
2016 Order Granting Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule.  
 3 
60(b), as there was a “complete absence of meaningful representation” by Mr. Nelson.2  
(Augmentation, pp.1-6.)  He argued that if his claims had been presented, the State’s 
motion for summary judgment would not have been granted.  (Augmentation, p.1.)  
Mr. Devan attached several documents to the motion; they included letters from him to 
Mr. Nelson’s paralegal, a letter from the paralegal to Mr. Devan, and a prison mail log.3   
(Augmentation, pp.8-26.)   
Mr. Devan also attached a supporting affidavit and supplemental affidavit.  
(Augmentation, pp.27-31.)  Those included a timeline of the post-conviction case and 
facts regarding the affidavit of Mr. Devan’s alibi witness, Lauren Jones, (hereinafter, 
Jones affidavit).  In his affidavit, Mr. Jones said that he was present when the burglary 
was committed, but Mr. Devan was not present.  (Augmentation, pp.33-35.)   
Mr. Devan’s supporting affidavit detailed his attempts to communicate with 
Mr. Nelson and his paralegal about the status and strategy of his case.  (Augmentation, 
pp.27-31).  He explained that on March 25, 2015, he received a letter from Mr. Nelson’s 
paralegal, so he called Mr. Nelson’s office, requested to speak with Mr. Nelson 
regarding amending the petition,4 and asked to be kept “informed of all the movements” 
in the case.  (Augmentation, p.28.)  He said that he was not told at that point that the 
State had already filed a motion for summary dismissal.  (Augmentation, p.28.) 
                                            
2 This appeal was suspended pending the decision on the motion.  (See February 17, 
2016, Order Granting Motion to Suspend the Appellate Proceedings.)   
3 In its order denying the motion, the district court said it did not rely on the facts 
contained in Mr. Devan’s motion and some of the attached documents because they 
were not properly authenticated.  (Augmentation, p.48, n.4.) 
4 His affidavit referred to the petition as a “complaint.”  (Augmentation, p.28.)   
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Additionally, he said that on April 16, 2015, he sent the Jones affidavit and 
transcripts from the trial to Mr. Nelson’s paralegal.5  (Augmentation, p.28.)  He also said 
that on April 21, 2015, he received a draft amended petition that did not contain the 
amendments he had requested.  (Augmentation, p.28.)  Therefore, he said that on or 
about May 14, 2015, he sent a letter to both Mr. Nelson and his paralegal, which 
requested specific corrections and additions.  (Augmentation, p.28.)  He also said that 
he sent a letter to the district court because he did not know what was going on with his 
case.  (Augmentation, p.28.)  He explained that he made “additional repeated calls” to 
Mr. Nelson and his paralegal, but Mr. Nelson did not answer, and his paralegal said that 
she did not know what was going on with his case.  (Augmentation, p.28.) 
He said that on or about June 17, 2015, he received the “exact same draft” of the 
proposed amended petition from Mr. Nelson as he had received in April.  
(Augmentation, p.28.)  Mr. Devan said that he then met with Mr. Nelson and his 
paralegal on June 18, 2015, and showed them the affidavit from Lauren Jones.  
(Augmentation, p.28.)  He also said that he expressed concern that the State would file 
a motion for summary dismissal, but even then was not told that the State had already 
done so.  (Augmentation, p.28.)   
On February 10, 2016, the State filed an objection to Mr. Devan’s Rule 60(b) 
motion.  (Augmentation, pp.37-39.)  The State argued that relief was not justified as Eby 
was distinguishable from Mr. Devan’s case because there was some communication 
between Mr. Devan and Mr. Nelson, and the proper procedure for a complaint such as 
                                            
5 Mr. Devan’s affidavit did not specifically identify the affidavit he sent as the one from 
Lauren Jones.  At this point, however, there were no other relevant affidavits to send to 
Mr. Nelson. 
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Mr. Devan’s would be a malpractice suit, not a Rule 60(b) motion.  (Augmentation, 
pp.37-39.)   
New counsel, Shane Darrington, was appointed for Mr. Devan, and a declaration 
in support of the Rule 60(b) motion was filed.  (Augmentation, pp.40-43).  That 
declaration focused on the Jones affidavit.  (Augmentation, pp.40-43.)  It asserted that 
the affidavit was mailed to Mr. Nelson in April of 2015, but no amended petition 
supported by the affidavit was ever filed.  (Augmentation, pp.41.)  As such, Mr. Devan 
asked the district court to set aside the order dismissing his petition and allow him to 
amend the petition to include the evidence in the Jones affidavit.  (Augmentation, p.42.) 
On May 4, 2016, the district court held a hearing at which Mr. Darrington clarified 
that Mr. Devan was seeking relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6).  (5/4/16 Tr., p.4, Ls.17-24.)  
Relying on Eby, he asserted that there were unique and compelling circumstances, 
which justified relief.  (5/4/16 Tr., p.5, L.1 – p.10, L.19.)  Specifically, he argued that 
there was a “complete absence of meaningful representation” because, among other 
things, Mr. Nelson admitted to the district court, at the hearing on the motion for 
summary dismissal, that he could not find any meritorious issues.  (5/4/16 Tr., p.13, 
Ls.3-16.)  The State argued that there was meaningful representation and, whether it 
was malpractice or not, Mr. Nelson made a legal decision to not contest the motion for 
summary dismissal.  (5/4/16 Tr., p.11, L.11 – p.12, L.9.)   
The district court denied Mr. Devan’s Rule 60(b) motion.  (Augmentation, pp.45-
50.)  It noted that, as in Eby, “there was nothing filed by defense counsel, including any 
response to the State’s motion for Summary Dismissal.”  (Augmentation, p.48.)  
However, it found that Mr. Devan’s case was distinguishable from Eby because 
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Mr. Devan’s affidavit described “multiple contacts,” which included a meeting between 
Mr. Devan and Mr. Nelson where the affidavit was discussed.  (Augmentation, p.48.)  
Thus, the district court found that there was “communication regarding the potential 
alibi, and that counsel considered this information and determined that there was no 
meritorious claim.”  (Augmentation, p.48.)  Therefore, it held there was not a complete 
lack of meaningful representation.  (Augmentation, p.48.) 
Additionally, it held that “even if there had been a lack of meaningful 
representation,” Mr. Devan had to “show, plead, or present evidence of facts which, if 
established, would constitute a meritorious claim in the action.”  (Augmentation, p.48.)  
It stated that, in order to be considered a meritorious post-conviction claim, “the claim 
would have to raise a genuine issue of material fact such that an evidentiary hearing is 
warranted.”  (Augmentation, p.49.)  It said Mr. Devan alleged his meritorious claim was 
“contained within the affidavit of Lauren Jones,” who said he was present when the 
crimes Mr. Devan was convicted of were committed, but Mr. Devan was not present.  
(Augmentation, p.49.)  The district court went on to analyze the contents of the affidavit 
and review the facts and witness testimony from the trial.  (Augmentation, pp.49-50.)  
Finally, the district court said that, “[g]iven the amount and weight of the evidence, 
Mr. Jones’s affidavit that there were two ‘Evins,’ one present during the night at times 
other than when the crimes were being committed, and the other present while the 
crimes were committed, was not reasonably likely to alter the decision of the jury.”  
(Augmentation, p.50.)  Therefore, the district court held that “there was no genuine 
issue of material fact such that an evidentiary hearing was warranted,” and there was 
not a “meritorious claim for which Petitioner is entitled to relief.”   (Augmentation, p.50.)     
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ISSUE 









 The district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Devan’s I.R.C.P. 60(b) 
motion because there was a complete absence of meaningful representation by his 
post-conviction counsel, and the district court performed an impermissible credibility 
determination of Mr. Devan’s evidence establishing a meritorious defense. 
 The district court performed a two-part analysis of Mr. Devan’s I.R.C.P. 60(b) 
motion, first analyzing whether Mr. Devan had met the requirements for relief under the 
rule, and then analyzing whether Mr. Devan had presented evidence of facts which, if 
true, would constitute a meritorious defense to the action—in this case, the state’s 
motion to dismiss Mr. Devan’s original post-conviction claim.  See Ponderosa Paint 
Mfg., Inc. v. Yack, 125 Idaho 310, 317 (Ct. App. 1994) (a party seeking relief from 
judgment under rule 60(b) must meet the requirements of the rule and also “show, plead 
or present evidence of facts which, if established, would constitute a meritorious 
defense to the action” (citing Reeves v. Wisenor, 102 Idaho 271, 272 (1981); Hearst 
Corp. v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10, 12 (1979)). 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“A trial court's decision whether to grant relief pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b) is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. The decision will be upheld if it appears that the trial 
court (1) correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, (2) acted within the boundaries 
of its discretion and consistent with the applicable legal standards, and (3) reached its 
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determination through an exercise of reason.”  Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 
Idaho 375, 380 (2010) (citations omitted).  For a district court to be found to have acted 
within its discretion when determining a Rule 60(b) motion, it must apply “the facts in a 
logical manner to the criteria set forth in Rule 60(b), while keeping in mind the policy 
favoring relief in doubtful cases....”  Id. 
 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Devan’s I.R.C.P. 
60(b) Motion Based On Its Conclusion That Mr. Devan Had Meaningful 
Representation Of Post-Conviction Counsel Even Though Counsel Did Not 
Respond To The State’s Motion For Summary Dismissal And Failed To Inform 
Mr. Devan That The State Had Filed A Motion To Dismiss His Post-Conviction 
Claim 
 
 The district court denied Mr. Devan’s Rule 60(b) motion, finding that he had not 
met the requirement of showing unique and compelling circumstances in the form of an 
absence of meaningful representation.  (Augmentation, p.48.)  The court focused on the 
fact that there was some communication between Mr. Devan and his post-conviction 
counsel, Mr. Nelson.  (Augmentation, p.48.)  This conclusion was an abuse of discretion 
because it misapplied Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731 (2010).  The district court found that 
the communication between Mr. Nelson and Mr. Devan meant that there was no 
complete absence of meaningful representation, as had been found in Eby.  
(Augmentation, p.48.)  In fact, Mr. Nelson never filed a response to the State’s motion 
for summary dismissal, never filed an amended petition, and never even told Mr. Devan 
that a motion for summary dismissal had been filed.  Mr. Devan had an affidavit in his 
possession that, had it been submitted with an amended petition, would almost certainly 
have overcome summary dismissal.  But because Mr. Nelson failed at even the most 
basic communication—telling Mr. Devan that the State had filed a motion to dismiss his 
 10 
claim—Mr. Devan was denied, by his own counsel, any opportunity to defend against 
that motion. 
 District courts may grant a Rule 60(b) motion when there are “unique and 
compelling circumstances” justifying relief.  Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 349 (1996) 
(citations omitted).  The Court in Eby held that “the complete absence of meaningful 
representation” in a post-conviction proceeding may present such unique and 
compelling circumstances.  Eby, 148 Idaho at 736-37. 
The affidavit submitted by Mr. Devan details the problems he experienced with 
his counsel.  (Augmentation, p.28.)  That affidavit made it clear that not only did 
Mr. Nelson not file a response to the State’s motion for summary dismissal, but he 
never even told Mr. Devan that the motion had been filed.  (Augmentation, p.28.)   As a 
result, Mr. Devan lost the only opportunity he had to present a meritorious issue.  Had 
Mr. Nelson filed an amended petition with the Jones affidavit—or at least told Mr. Devan 
that the motion had been filed, so that Mr. Devan could have tried to fire Mr. Nelson and 
file an amended petition himself—he could have presented a genuine issue of material 
fact.   
In its order denying Mr. Devan’s Rule 60(b) motion, the district court focused on 
the fact that there was some communication between Mr. Nelson and Mr. Devan.  
(Augmentation, p.48.)  As such, it found that this case was distinguishable from Eby.  
(Augmentation, p.48.)  It said, “[T]he Court finds that there was communication between 
counsel and Petitioner, specifically there was communication regarding the potential 
alibi, and that counsel considered this information and determined that there was no 
meritorious claim.”  (Augmentation, p.48.)  Therefore, it held that “there was not a 
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complete lack of meaningful representation.”  (Augmentation, p.48.)  However, the fact 
that there was communication is not the issue.  The issue is whether Mr. Nelson’s 
representation of Mr. Devan was meaningful in any way. 
 In Eby, one of the several issues on appeal was whether neglect by post-
conviction counsel could provide grounds for relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) and, if so, 
whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Eby’s motion.  Id. at 
736.  The district court had appointed a public defender to represent Mr. Eby upon his 
timely filing of a pro se motion for post-conviction relief and request for court-appointed 
counsel.  Id. at 733.  When a conflict arose, another attorney was substituted to 
represent Mr. Eby.  Id.  After that attorney failed to file any documents for six months, 
and the district court threatened dismissal for inactivity, another attorney, Mr. Kehne, 
was appointed for Mr. Eby.  Id. 
 Mr. Kehne represented Mr. Eby for approximately three years.  Id.  As the Idaho 
Supreme Court found, “[d]uring this time, Mr. Kehne filed no amendments to Eby’s pro 
se petition nor any response to the State’s motion for summary dismissal.”  Id.  While it 
is unclear from the facts whether Mr. Kehne met with Mr. Eby during that time, it is clear 
that Mr. Kehne did work on the case, filing four responses to the notices of dismissal 
and requests for retention.  Id.  As the Court noted, “[t]hese responses did indicate that 
Mr. Kehne had conducted a ‘review, investigation, research and analysis of post-
conviction issues.’”  Id.  Ultimately, however, Mr. Kehne failed to file an amended 
petition on Mr. Eby’s behalf.  Id.  Under these circumstances, in which Mr. Kehne had 
worked on Mr. Eby’s case but had not filed an amended petition nor a response to the 
State’s motion for summary dismissal, and without discussing the extent of 
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communication between Mr. Kehne and Mr. Eby at all, the Idaho Supreme Court found 
that there had been a “complete absence of meaningful representation.”  Id. at 736-37.  
Emphasizing the “unique status of a post-conviction proceeding,” the Court concluded 
that Mr. Eby’s case “may present the ‘unique and compelling circumstances’ in which 
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) relief may well be warranted.”  Id. at 737. 
In this case, the district court misapplied Eby by finding that communication 
between Mr. Nelson and Mr. Devan called for a different result than Eby.  Eby is not 
about communication.  It is about meaningful representation.  Here, Mr. Nelson’s 
representation was not meaningful because he did nothing to advance his client’s case 
even though his client had given him a document that would almost certainly have 
prevented summary judgment.  Just as in Eby, Mr. Nelson failed to file a response to 
the State’s motion, and he failed to file an amended petition.  Instead, he neglected to 
tell his client that the State’s motion had even been filed and went to the hearing on the 
motion and told the district court that there were no meritorious issues.  (Augmentation, 
p.28; 7/10/15 Tr., p.5, Ls.17-25.)                                            
United States Supreme Court precedent also supports the conclusion that, in this 
scenario, Mr. Nelson’s representation was not meaningful.  In Anders v. California, 386 
U.S. 738, 742 (1967), appointed counsel on appeal wrote a letter to the court saying 
that he would not file a brief because he thought there was “no merit to the appeal.”  
The Court said, “The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process 
can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of active advocate in behalf of his 
client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae.”  Id. at 744.   
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Anders pertained to a direct appeal, but the Court’s language bears on this case, 
especially in light of more recent United States Supreme Court opinions.  Those 
opinions emphasize the importance of a defendant’s rights to a full and fair opportunity 
to bring ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on post-conviction, as such a 
“collateral proceeding is in many ways the equivalent of a prisoner’s direct appeal as to 
the ineffective-assistance claim.”  Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012); see 
also Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).  Thus, much like Eby, these cases hold 
that when ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel essentially bars a 
defendant’s ability to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, there is an 
exception to the rule that defendants are typically bound by their attorney’s actions.  
Similar to the situation here, in Martinez, the petitioner’s post-conviction counsel 
“did not raise the ineffective-assistance claim in the first collateral proceeding, and, 
indeed, filed a statement that, after reviewing the case, she found no meritorious claims 
helpful to petitioner.”  132 S. Ct. at 1313.  As such, the Court said, “To protect prisoners 
with a potentially legitimate claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, it is 
necessary to modify the unqualified statement in [Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 772 
(1991)] that an attorney’s ignorance or inadvertence in a postconviction proceeding 
does not qualify as cause to excuse a procedural default.”  Id.  The court noted that 
where a post-conviction proceeding is the first opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective 
assistance at trial, the proceeding is “in many ways the equivalent of a prisoner’s direct 
appeal as to the ineffective-assistance claim.”  Id. at 1317.   
Martinez came out of Arizona where ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
cannot be made on direct appeal but must be raised in a post-conviction proceeding.  
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Id. at 131.  However, the following year, in Trevino, the Court held that the same rule 
applies to states, such as Idaho, that do not require defendants to raise such a claim on 
post-conviction but make it “virtually impossible” for appellate counsel to do so because 
the trial record often does not contain information which would support the claim.  133 
S. Ct. at 1918 (2013) (quoting Robinson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 808, 810-811 (2000)).  
Idaho has a similar court structure.  See Veenstra v. Smith, 2014 WL 1270626, at *11 
(D. Idaho Mar. 26, 2014).    
Here, Mr. Nelson’s inaction, and his failure to communicate with Mr. Devan about 
the State’s filing the motion for summary dismissal was actually worse for Mr. Devan 
than having no counsel at all.  The nature of Mr. Devan’s I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion, and his 
affidavits, show that he had educated himself on the post-conviction process, knew that 
an amended petition would be necessary, and was well aware that the State would file a 
motion for summary dismissal based on his initial petition.6  (Augmentation, pp.1-6, 27-
31.)  Indeed, these documents indicate that, had he ever been informed as to the status 
of his case, he would have been able to file an amended petition himself.  But 
Mr. Devan never had that opportunity because Mr. Nelson never told him about the 
impending summary dismissal.  Thus, there may have been communication, but it was 
meaningless.  The crucial information—that the State had filed a motion, and there was 
an upcoming hearing—was never communicated by Mr. Nelson.  This is a unique and 
compelling circumstance because, as a result of Mr. Nelson’s representation, Mr. Devan 
lost his only opportunity to raise challenges to his conviction.   
                                            
6 He acknowledged that he had to “set forth his allegations” in his post-conviction 
petition “in a cursory fashion due to delay in acquiring new evidence in an admissible 
form.”  (Augmentation, p.3.)   
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Therefore, this case is indistinguishable from Eby in all relevant aspects, and the 
only communication that would have actually helped Mr. Devan never occurred.  The 
district court stated that “[t]he fact that counsel disagreed with Petitioner about the 
validity of various arguments or the value of the evidence and declined to proceed with 
the claims does not mean there was no meaningful representation.”  (Augmentation, 
p.48.)  That is simply not true.   
Mr. Nelson’s inaction sabotaged Mr. Devan’s only opportunity to overcome 
summary dismissal.  Had he been properly informed, Mr. Devan could have elected to 
proceed pro se.  Martinez and Trevino make it clear that “[a] prisoner’s inability to 
present a claim of trial error is of particular concern when the claim is one of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.”  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317.  Here, the district court abused its 
discretion because it misapplied Eby and held that communication by post-conviction 
counsel, no matter how meaningless that communication was, established that there 
was meaningful representation.  Nothing in Eby suggests that this is the standard. 
 
D. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Held That The Jones Affidavit 
Did Not Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact 
 
As the district court noted, the standard to succeed on a 60(b) motion is that the 
Petitioner must “show, plead, or present evidence of facts, which, if established, would 
constitute a meritorious claim in the action.” Ponderosa Paint, 125 Idaho at 317; 
Augmentation, p.48.  The court went on to say, “For a claim to be considered 
meritorious in the context of a post-conviction action sufficient to warrant setting aside 
the judgment, the claim would have to raise a genuine issue of material fact such that 
an evidentiary hearing is warranted.”  (Augmentation, p.49.)  Mr. Devan did show and 
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present evidence justifying an evidentiary hearing.  The Jones affidavit shows the 
testimony of a witness who stated Mr. Devan was not present at the burglary.  The 
affidavit is from a witness present at the scene who stated that Mr. Devan was not 
present at the scene.  The allegations in the Jones affidavit, if found true by a fact-finder 
at an evidentiary hearing, would support Mr. Devan’s initial claims that his trial counsel 
failed to secure witnesses and investigate a defense.  Therefore, the affidavit raised a 
genuine issue of material fact as to the motion to dismiss those claims. 
The district court abused its discretion when, instead of relying on the presence 
of the affidavit, it analyzed the credibility of the statements made in the affidavit.  
(Augmentation, pp.49-50.)  That should have been the role of a fact-finder at an 
evidentiary hearing, not the district court evaluating the Rule 60(b) motion.   
Here, the district court did not simply determine whether, if true, the affidavit 
raised issues material to the motion to dismiss, it actually analyzed whether the affidavit 
was true and whether it would suffice to exonerate Mr. Devan on the burglary charge.  
(Augmentation, pp.49-50.)  That was well beyond the scope of the question before the 
district court and a misapplication of the law regarding Rule 60(b) analyses. See 
Ponderosa Paint, 125 Idaho at 317. The question before the court was only this: Did 
Mr. Devan show evidence of facts that, if established, would raise an issue of material 
fact such that his post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel should 
not have been summarily dismissed?  The Jones affidavit did just that.          
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Devan respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order 
denying his Rule 60(b) motion and remand the case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 11th day of October, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      REED P. ANDERSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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